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ABSTRACT
The current research uses the Associative

Propositional Evaluative model (APE; Gawronski &

Bodenhausen, 2006) to examine the processes that underlie
African Americans explicit versus implicit
self-evaluations. Specifically, explicit self-evaluations
are affected by propositional processes that consciously

assess the validity of an automatic evaluation. Implicit
self-evaluations are affected by associative processes

that occur automatically when responding to contextual
cues. The main prediction is that among African-American
participants whose ethnic identity is made salient, those
who receive negative feedback will show lower levels of

implicit self-esteem because old evaluations stored in
memory are activated, but such feedback will have no

effect on explicit self-esteem because self-protective
mechanisms are adopted, compared to those who receive no
)

feedback. Participants received either negative feedback

or no feedback and completed measures of implicit and
explicit self-esteem. In partial support of this
prediction, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, when their
ethnicity is made salient, strongly identified African
Americans exhibited lower implicit self-esteem, but not

lower explicit self-esteem, after receiving negative

iii

performance feedback on an intelligence test. In partial
support of the APE model, Study 2 further demonstrated
that early experience with racism and psychological

disengagement from the domain of intelligence

differentially predicted implicit versus explicit

self-esteem. Together, this research provides partial
support for the distinct processes that affect explicit
and implicit self-evaluations.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The self-esteem of African Americans appears to be

unique. As a historically disadvantaged group that often

perceives racism (Major & O'Brien, 2005), one might
predict that African Americans internalize the stigma of
their group and thus exhibit relatively low self-esteem

(Clark & Clark, 1947). This hypothesis is in line with the
looking-glass self approach (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934),
which posits that an individual's self-concept is

influenced by others' perceptions. Based on the

looking-glass self approach, since stigmatized individuals
are often viewed negatively, then these individuals should

adopt such attitudes into their self-concept. The theory
of self-fulfilling prophecy also supports the notion that

stigmatized individuals should suffer from a relatively

poor self-image (Merton, 1948). This viewpoint suggests

that if the negative stereotypes of one's ingroup are

applied to a group member, then such a person might behave
in ways to confirm the stereotype. As a result, the
outgroup target believes he or she is representative of
the negative stereotype, which might result in a

relatively poor self-image such as low self-esteem.
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In spite of these theories, evidence demonstrates
that African Americans do not show a decrease in

self-esteem when faced with situations that threaten their

self-concept (Crocker & Major, 1989). Rather, their
self-esteem is maintained (no change) or, at times,

heightened because they use self-protective mechanisms
that allow them to either attribute threatening feedback

to discrimination or disengage from a domain that is group
"irrelevant" such as taking an intelligence-related test

(Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, &

Crocker, 1998; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991).
Crocker and Major's Theory of Self Esteem

Research by Crocker, Major, and their colleagues has

demonstrated the conditions under which the explicit

self-esteem of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized groups

is or is not affected (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker &
Major, 2003; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Crocker and Major's
(1989) main‘thesis is that when African Americans
experience a threat to the self, they do not show a

decrease in explicit self-esteem, but maintain it, because
they adopt self-protective mechanisms (also see

Ashburn-Nardo, 2010). The self-protective mechanisms
include attributing a self-threat to discrimination,
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making in-group comparisons, and disengaging from a domain
that African Americans are stereotyped to perform poorly

on (Crocker & Major, 1989) . Interestingly, since these
protective mechanisms are unique to African Americans,

other stigmatized groups do not use such mechanisms and
often show a decrease in explicit self-esteem following a
threat to the self (Crocker & Major, 2003). In support of

this, Twenge and Crocker (2002) recently conducted a

meta-analysis looking at ethnic-racial group differences

in self-esteem. The results showed that African Americans
had higher self-esteem than Whites, Hispanics, and Asians,

in spite of the fact that African Americans have suffered
disproportionately from a long history of racism in the
United States (Twenge & Crocker, 2002; Takaki, 2008).

Twenge and Crocker (2002) suggest a cultural

psychological explanation for why African Americans, as a
group, have relatively high self-esteem. They posit that

individualism, which heavily emphasizes people as
independent and focuses on personal growth and uniqueness,
is associated with high self-esteem within a culture as
well as between cultures. Since African Americans are

higher on individualism than Whites and Latinos (no
difference between these two latter groups), followed by
Asian Americans (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002),
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then they are able to detach their self-concept from a

particular group in which they belong. This suggests that
African Americans can protect their collective identity
when faced with a threat that is linked to their ethnicity

by highlighting their personal identity, resulting in

higher self-esteem following a threat. In contrast, high
collectivist individuals may be more likely to see
themselves in terms of the collective identity and
decrease their personal identity; they may exhibit low

self-esteem following a threat to identity with their
social group.
One factor that remains unexplored is the conditions
under which African Americans do not use self-protective

mechanisms, and thus show lower self-esteem. To this end,
the current research distinguishes explicit self-esteem

from implicit self-esteem. Crocker and Major's,

(2003)

studies measure explicit self-esteem, which is a
self-evaluation that is conscious to an individual and

thus it is captured on self-report measures. In contrast,
implicit self-esteem is automatic or unconscious, formed
at an early age and through repeated experiences, and thus

it is captured on indirect measures such as response
latency tasks. Implicit self-esteem is important to

examine because it predicts the effect that success or
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failure feedback has on an individual's mood and
self-evaluation (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), somatic

symptoms such as breathing difficulties, disease,
headaches, aches and pains, and indigestion (Robinson,
Mitchell, Kirkeby, & Meier, 2006), future depressive

symptamotology (Franck, Raedt, & Houwer, 2007), and
spontaneous and/or affectively driven reactions such as
nonverbal anxiety behaviors and negative mood (Bosson,
Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000).
The associative-propositional evaluative model (APE;

Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) may help explain the

conditions under which African Americans will use (or not)

mechanisms that protect their explicit versus implicit
self-esteem. The APE model suggests that there are dual
processes that underlie self-esteem: explicit self-esteem

is influenced by propositional processes and implicit
self-esteem is influenced by associative processes. Before
we describe the self-esteem hypotheses that follow from
the APE model, we first review this model's general

assumptions and hypotheses.
The Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model
The APE model starts with the assumption that
individuals assess the "truth value" of all self- and
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others-based evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
When doing so, propositional processes affect explicit

evaluations whereas associative processes affect implicit
evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). During an
associative process, an input triggers the pattern of

association (which is a preexisting structure of
associations) that is stored in memory leading to an

automatic evaluation. Such automatic evaluations can be
activated regardless of whether the individual views the

evaluation as true. When the pattern of association in

memory is changed by certain information, it can change
implicit evaluations. For example, Dijksterhuis (2004)

found that compared with being primed with self-related
neutral words, participants who were primed with

self-related positive words showed an increase in implicit
self-esteem. Presumably, when information does not
activate old associations stored in memory, implicit

evaluations should remain unaltered.
During a propositional process, people can

consciously search for relevant information to assess the

accuracy of an automatic evaluation. Alternatively, they
can use propositions to defy or change the evaluation. If
relevant information does not yield an accurate evaluation

or propositions are considered that disconfirm the
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evaluation, the initial and automatically activated

associative evaluations are changed and are exhibited in

people's explicit evaluations. For example, research has

shown that a recent negative encounter with a member of a
social group results in a general negative evaluation of
that group and the reverse is true if having a positive

encounter with a member from a social group (Gawronski,

Bodenhausen, & Banse, 2005; Henderson-King & Nisbett,

1996). Furthermore, propositions can also confirm the
initial evaluation, leading to no change in explicit

evaluations.
The Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model
and the Implicit versus Explicit Self-Esteem
of. African-Americans
The relationship between implicit and explicit

self-esteem can occur such that implicit self-esteem is
influenced by contextual factors, while explicit

self-esteem remains unaltered. This occurs when there is a
change in patterns of associations in memory, but
considered propositions lead to a rejection of an

associative evaluation. In line with the APE model, the

implicit self-esteem of African-Americans should be
influenced or altered when preexisting patterns of

associations are temporarily changed because some external
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stimuli activated old evaluations stored in memory. These
old evaluations are formed from attitudes that are learned

by interacting with others throughout one's development of
the self and identity (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934; Rudman,

2004; Clark & Clark, 1939). Once these old evaluations are
learned, they are activated by contextual factors

regardless of whether or not the perceiver views the
evaluation as true. On the other hand, the explicit

self-esteem of African-Americans should be influenced when
contextual or external stimuli activate associations that
lead to a certain evaluation of an object. Specifically,

propositional processes are activated when one assesses
the validity of that evaluation. If that evaluation is not

perceived as true to the individual, cognitive elaboration
may be used to access explicit attitudes from memory (cf.

Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).

We suggest that negative feedback about an
African-American's intellectual performance when linked to
their ethnic identity is likely to impact their implicit

self-esteem by activating old evaluations stored in

memory. African-Americans are stereotyped to be
unintelligent because their group has a strong history of

being perceived as intellectually inferior (Devine, 1989;
Takaki, 2008). Such perceptions of their group are learned
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at an early age because of media portrayals and their

experiences with individual and institutional forms of

discrimination (McKown & Weinstein, 2003; Phinney &
Chavira, 1995; Phinney & Cobb, 1996; Miller & Macintosh,

1999; Sanders, 1997). Such evaluations learned early in
their development should be activated by contextual
factors that remind them of their group's stereotyped
intellectual abilities, thus activating implicit
self-evaluations of unintelligent (or less intelligent)
and low esteem.

However, in line with the APE model, African

Americans' explicit self-esteem can remain relatively
unaltered. During the propositional process, if

propositions are considered to resolve an inaccurate

evaluation, associative evaluations may not be taken as
valid evaluations. For African Americans, using protective
mechanisms such as disengaging from a domain irrelevant to
the ethnic group (i.e., intelligence test performance) are

external inputs that serve as propositions in assessing
the validity of an associative evaluation. Such a

protective mechanism should reduce their trust in negative

intelligence-related feedback, which leads to a rejection

of the activated associative evaluations about the self as
a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. Although changes
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in the patterns of associations may occur because of the

activated initial associative evaluation learned early in

life (and thus leading to relatively low implicit
self-esteem), those changes may not be reflected in

African Americans' explicit self-esteem because of changes
to the initial associative evaluation. In line with this

rationale and countless studies by Crocker, Major, and
their colleagues (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker & Major,

2003; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Crocker et al., 1991),

explicit self-esteem remains unaffected regardless of the
present contextual cues.

Overview of Current Research
In summary, past research demonstrates that African
Americans use protective mechanisms when evaluating the

self when they face a threat to their self-image — here,
their explicit self-esteem remains unaffected (Crocker et

al., 1991). The APE model suggests that this process

occurs because African Americans use protective
mechanisms, a proposition used to assess the validity of
the associative evaluation. Because such a propositional

process results in an "invalid" associative evaluation,
there is no change in explicit self-esteem. By comparison,
the APE model suggests that implicit self-esteem should be
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more sensitive to changes as a function of contextual
cues. African Americans who are presented with negative

feedback about their performance should have increased

accessibility to the old evaluations about their ethnic
group being stereotyped as unintelligent whether or not
they consider the stereotype to be true. Such evaluations
can harm the overall self-image of African Americans, and

thus lead to relatively low implicit self-esteem. The APE
model elucidates how contextual cues can result in no

change in explicit self-esteem due to the use of

protective mechanisms, but they may result in changes in
implicit self-esteem due to the activation of old

evaluations.
The purpose of the current research is to test the

APE model as a framework for demonstrating the conditions
under which the implicit and explicit self-esteem of

African Americans are affected. Leary, Terry, Allen, and

Tate (2009) demonstrate that negative feedback about an
intelligence test is the most common method used to
successfully induce a threat to one's self and identity.
For African-Americans, threatening feedback about an

intellectual task in the context of their ethnic identity

should activate associative and propositional processes.
Therefore, we tested our main hypothesis in an
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experimental condition in which African Americans receive
(bogus) negative intelligence-related feedback after their

ethnic identity is made salient. Then, we measure implicit
and explicit self-esteem (Study 1 and Study 2),

self-stereotyping (Study 2), and early experiences with
racism and disengagement from intelligence (Study 2).
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CHAPTER TWO
STUDY ONE

We predicted that when identity is made salient,
negative intelligence-related feedback will not affect
African Americans' explicit self-esteem compared to a
no-feedback condition (Prediction la). Evidence in support

of this prediction would replicate the work of Crocker et
al.

(1991) that demonstrates that African Americans

maintain their explicit self-esteem following a threat to
the self because they adopt protective mechanisms. By

comparison, we predict that when ethnic identity is made

salient negative intelligence-related feedback will lower
African Americans' implicit self-esteem compared to a
no-feedback condition (Prediction lb). Presumably this is
the case because the old evaluations that are stored in

memory will be activated.

Method

Participants and Design
Sixty-eight self-identified African-American students

(91% women; Mage = 26.25, age range: 19-55 years) from
California State University, San Bernardino, participated

in this study for course extra credit. Twelve participants
were omitted from the analysis: three guessed the
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hypothesis, eight failed to follow procedural or
measurement instructions, and one was an outlier on
multiple measures. The final sample size was 56

participants. The experiment adopted a 2 (Ethnic identity
salience: yes or no) X 2 (Performance feedback: negative

or none) between-participants design.
Materials
Standardized Intelligence Test. The intelligence
test, identical to Laws (2009) consisted of fifteen
quantitative and reasoning related items typical in a
standardized test (see Appendix A). The test was intended

to be ambiguous enough for participants to believe either
the positive or negative feedback. To develop an ambiguous

test, we administered the test across two phases as part

of another project in our laboratory. In Phase 1
(N = 147), we administered 34 items (from Galinksy, Wang,
& Ku, 2008; Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008),
then scored the level of difficulty of each item using the

difficulty feature in the Test Analysis Program
(http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~brooksg/software.htm). The

program uses the proportion correct as an index of
difficulty. The final 15 items were selected evenly from

among the easy items (i.e., items that at least 80% of the
participants got correct), the mid-difficult items (i.e.,
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items that 50-80% of the participants got correct), and
the very difficult items (i.e., items that less than 50%

of the participants got correct). In Phase 2 (N = 22), the
final 15 items were administered to test the credibility

of the false feedback on the intelligence test. After
completing the test, participants received either positive

feedback suggesting that they did very well on the test

(i.e., 93rd percentile) or negative feedback conditions
suggesting that they did not do well on the test (i.e.,
47th percentile; more details about this feedback
procedure are presented below), then they completed

several Likert-type items measuring their feelings,
agreement, accuracy, and certainty regarding their

performance on the test. The specific items were
a) "Please indicate how you felt after receiving your

score" on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 (positive) ,

b) "Please indicate your agreement with the feedback on

this particular test." on a scale ranging from 1 (agree
very much) to 7

(disagree very much), and c) "Please

indicate the extent to which you believe that the feedback

was accurate of your performance on the test." on a scale

ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 7 (extremely
accurate) .
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Participants in the positive feedback condition

indicated they felt relatively positive after receiving

their score (Mpositive = 5.09) than those individuals in the
negative feedback condition (Mnegative = 3.55),

F(l,20) = 6.31, p = .02. However, participants did not
vary across feedback conditions in the extent to which
they agreed with the performance feedback (Mnegative = 2.91
vs. Mpositive = 2.45) and the extent to which they believed
the feedback was accurate of their performance feedback

(^negative = 3.10 VS. Mpositive = 3.00), Fs > 1.44, ps > .23.

Independent Variables
Ethnic Identity Salience. After completing the

consent form, participants randomly assigned to the ethnic
identity salience condition were asked to complete a brief

demographic questionnaire in which they identified their
ethnicity and age. Then, as part of the introduction to

the intelligence test, these participants read, "This test

has been administered to White college students and has

been standardized for that group only. Your data will help
us determine whether or not this test can be standardized
for African Americans." Participants in the control

condition did not complete this identity salience
procedure.
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Test Performance Feedback. All participants completed
the standardized intelligence. Participants were told that
the purpose of the study was to "complete a new

computerized form of intelligence test." After completing
the intelligence test, participants randomly assigned to
the negative performance feedback condition were prompted

to select "continue" to calculate their score. Then, they

read:
"Computer is calculating your score...Please wait"
After ten seconds, a new screen appeared and read:

"Just a few more seconds..."

After five seconds, a new screen appeared and read:
"We have calculated your score. Compared to other

students who have completed this test, you scored in
the "47th percentile."
Participants in the no-feedback control condition did
not complete this feedback procedure. Prior to completing
the test, control participants read, "In this study, we
are interested in gathering data to enter in a bank for

analyses later. Therefore, you will not receive feedback

after the test because we are interested in how people

perform in general, as opposed to your individual

performance." We used this cover story because we wanted
participants to complete the same test as the participants
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in the false performance feedback condition, but we did
not want their test performance to have any relevance to

their self-image.

Dependent Variables

Implicit Self-Esteem. The protocol for the following
measure is identical to that used in the thesis of Laws

(2009). An Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was administered to measure
implicit self-esteem (Self-Esteem IAT). In general, an IAT

is a computerized task that measures the relative strength

with which two target groups (e.g., the self vs. others)
are associated with two opposing evaluations (e.g., good

words vs. bad words) using response latency to

operationalize attitude strength. In the Self-Esteem IAT,
participants saw 4 types of stimuli presented one at a

time on a computer screen. Two types of stimuli consisted
of first-person pronouns (e.g., "me") and third-person

pronouns (e.g., "they"). The other two types of stimuli
consisted of words related to "good" (e.g., "joy",
"paradise"), and words related to "bad" (e.g., "filth",
"vomit"; see Appendix B for all IAT stimuli). In an IAT,

participants' task is to categorize the 4 types of stimuli
using 2 designated response keys on the keyboard. In the
case of the Self-Esteem IAT, for one-half of the task,
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participants were instructed to categorize first person
pronouns and words associated with good using the same key
("me+good") and simultaneously to categorize third person

pronouns and words associated with bad using the other key
("they+bad"). For the other one-half of the task, the key

assignment was reversed (e.g., "me+bad," "they+good"). The

order of the two tasks was counterbalanced between

participants.

The underlying rationale of the IAT is that when

highly associated words share the same response key,
participants typically classify them quickly and easily;

however, when weakly associated words share the same

response key, participants tend to classify them more
slowly and with greater difficulty. In the Self-Esteem

IAT, we expected that participants would perform the
classification task relatively fast when

first-person-related and good-related words shared the

same response key while third-person-related and
bad-related words shared the other response key.

(The

logic of this computerized task is easier to understand if

readers take an IAT. Several IATs assessing implicit

attitudes toward various groups can be self-administered
anonymously at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ ).
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A plethora of research has used the IAT to reliably
and validly measure people's implicit attitudes toward the

self (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;

Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellot, 2002;

Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003;
Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2003; Brihol, Petty, & Wheeler,

2006). In one such study using the Self-Esteem IAT,
Farnham, Greenwald, and Banaji (1999) found that people

made faster associations between me words and pleasant
words rather than when me words were paired with

unpleasant words. Furthermore, past studies have found
that high implicit self-esteem, as measured with the IAT,

is associated with greater implicit ingroup bias (Farnham
et al., 1999; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2003). Recently,
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) conducted

a meta analysis using 184 studies and found that the

beliefs and attitudes measured with an IAT predict
theoretically important behavioral and physiological
outcomes (Mean r = .27).

Explicit Self-Esteem. The Heatherton and Polivy
(1991) State Self-Esteem Scale which Crocker used to
measure state self-esteem (see Appendix C) was used to

assess participants' explicit self-esteem. This measure
contains 20 items that are divided into three subscales of
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self-esteem (e.g., performance, appearance, and social)
and includes items such as, "I am worried about my

performance" and "I feel like I'm not doing well."

Participants indicated the degree to which they agreed or
disagreed with the statement at the current moment using a
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Higher

mean scores indicate higher explicit self-esteem.
Procedure
A female researcher informed participants that they

would participate in two separate and unrelated studies,
one on cognition, and another on personality. To enhance

the "two separate studies" cover story, participants

reviewed and signed two different consent forms. In the

"first study" participants completed the computerized
intelligence test, and in the "second study" participants

completed the implicit and explicit self-esteem measures
which were counterbalanced. Finally, participants
completed an extensive demographics questionnaire (see

Appendix D), were probed for suspicion of the purpose of
the study (see Appendix E), and thoroughly debriefed (see
Appendix F).
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Results

Explicit and Implicit Self-esteem Descriptives

Scores on the measures of self-esteem indicated that
participants had relatively high explicit self-esteem

(M = 3.94; SD = .57). The scores on this measure were
normally distributed (zskew = -.50). Using a

well-established scoring algorithm by Greenwald, Nosek,
and Banaji (2003), a Self-Esteem IAT score was calculated
for each participant using a modified effect size such

that a large positive IAT effect size (abbreviated as SE
IAT D) indicates relatively high implicit self-esteem, or

stronger associations between the self and

positive-related words than associations between the self
and negative-related words. Participants had relatively

high implicit self-esteem (M = .57; SD = .38). The scores

on this measure were normally distributed (zskew = -.56).
The scores on the measures of implicit and explicit

self-esteem were not significantly correlated r = .16,
p = .24.
The Effects of Negative Feedback and Ethnic
Identity Salience on Implicit and Explicit
Self-esteem

An ANOVA in which ethnic identity salience and false
feedback were the independent variables and implicit
*
self-esteem was the dependent variable, revealed no
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significant main effects of ethnic identity salience or
feedback. However, as predicted, the Ethnic Salience X

False Feedback interaction was significant,
F (1,

52) = 4.69, p < .05. As shown in Figure 1, among

participants whose ethnic identity was made salient, those
who received negative feedback showed lower levels of

implicit self-esteem (M = .40) than those who did not

receive feedback (M - .66), F(l, 35) = 4.07, p < .05.

However, among participants whose ethnicity was not made
salient, implicit self-esteem was not affect by feedback,
F

(1, 52) = 1.02, ns. A similar ANOVA to the one above was

conducted, but explicit self-esteem was the dependent
variable. The results revealed no significant main effect

and, most importantly, no significant interaction effect

on explicit self-esteem, F (1, 52) = 2.06, ns.
Additional Analyses: Moderating Effect of Ethnic
Identification
Research suggests that racial centrality (defined by
how strongly individuals identify with their social group)
moderates the effect of specific contexts (i.e., feedback)

on stigma-related beliefs and behavior (Rowler, Sellers,
Chavous, & Smith, 1998). Therefore, it is important to
test if identification with a social group moderates the

effect of contextual cues on the self-concept. In line

23

with this rationale, Major, Quinton, and Schmader (2002)
found that high gender-identified women made more

attributions to discrimination than low identified women
when ambiguous prejudice cues (e.g., unfair grading

between guys and girls) were present in the situation, but

this effect did not occur when prejudice cues were absent
or obvious. In the present research, it is plausible that
highly identified African Americans would show lower

levels of implicit self-esteem when they receive negative

performance feedback compared to no feedback. This might
be the case because highly identified African Americans
may have easier access to their memories of early

experiences with racism, which we predict is associated
with lower implicit self-esteem. Highly identified African
Americans are more likely to be aware of racism and

discrimination against their group, and thus have a better
recollection of those memories.
As part of a background questionnaire, participants

completed a single item that measured African-Americans'
subjective ethnic-racial identity: "Being an

African-American is an important part of who I am." The

item was adopted from Sellers et al.'s (1997)
MMRI-Centrality scale, which captures the extent to which

race is significant to an African-American's perception of
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self; also, centrality of one's identity is considered to
be chronically salient and relatively stable regardless of

context (also see Sellers et al., 1998, Leach et al.,
2008). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement

with the statement on a nine-point scale ranging from "Not

at all" (1) to "Very much" (9). The midpoint was labeled

"Somewhat" (5). The distribution of the scores was
negatively skewed. Furthermore, since there were not

enough low identifiers (n = 8) to fill the different
feedback conditions, the analyses consist of high

identifiers only. A high identification group consisted of
participants with scores equal to 8.0 (n = 6) or 9.0

(n = 39).

Post hoc tests revealed a significant effect of the
interaction between feedback and ethnic identity salience
among participants who strongly identified as. African

American F (1, 41 - 11.64, p = .001. The implicit
self-esteem of participants whose ethnic identity was made

salient, varied as a function of experimental condition
F

(1, 24) = 7.29, p = .01, Cohen's d = 1.06 . In line with

our prediction, participants who received negative

feedback (M = .36, SD - .40) showed lower implicit

self-esteem compared to participants who received no
feedback (M = .77, SD = .37). Participants whose ethnic
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identity was not made salient showed no differences on
implicit self-esteem as a function of feedback and

identity salience F (1, 21) = 2.95, p > .05. There were no

significant main effects or interactions on explicit

self-esteem as a result of strongly identifying as African
American.

Discussion

Results revealed that African American participants
exhibited relatively low implicit self-esteem when they
received negative feedback about their performance linked

to their ethnic identity. Furthermore, replicating Crocker
and Major's (1989) research, African American

participants' explicit self-esteem was unaffected by
identity salience and false feedback, presumably because
our participants used protective mechanisms to shield
their self-image from a threat. We interpret these

divergent effects on implicit versus explicit self-esteem
in light of the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006),

which posits that explicit self-esteem should remain

unaffected by threats to the self because of added
propositional processes (i.e., protective mechanismsbut

implicit self-esteem can be affected due to the activation
of old evaluations stored in memory. Such old negative
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evaluations are presumably formed from early experiences
and can be activated by contextual cues (Rudman, 2004).

Additional analyses revealed that the effect of

feedback on low implicit self-esteem was significant among

strongly identified participants. African Americans who
highly identify with a stigmatized group and who have
their ethnic identity made salient may internalize the

stigma associated with the group and this process is

revealed implicitly when individuals receive a threat and
that threat is also related to a negative stereotype about

their stigmatized group (i.e., negative performance
feedback). African Americans who strongly identify may be

particularly sensitive to contextual cues that trigger

old, negative evaluations stored in memory and hence lead
to low implicit self-esteem, but leave explicit

self-esteem unaffected.
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CHAPTER THREE
STUDY TWO

The first main goal of Study 2 is to provide

additional evidence for the propositional processes
underlying explicit self-esteem and the associative

processes underlying implicit self-esteem. If
self-protective mechanisms were adopted as added

propositions in the propositional process that lead to no
change in explicit self-esteem, then participants should
exhibit evidence of using such mechanisms when they

receive negative performance feedback that is linked to
their ethnicity (relative to a control condition).
Furthermore, if these same contextual cues trigger old

evaluations that are stored in memory and thus lowers
implicit self-esteem, then participants should show

evidence of enhanced early experiences with racism. To
test these hypotheses, Study 2 administered measures of

intelligence-domain disengagement as a protective

mechanism and early experiences of racism.
The second main goal of the Study 2 was to test the

effects of negative performance feedback on a different
self-evaluation variable: self-stereotyping. According to

self-categorization theory (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Turner,
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1999), when an individual's social identity is made
salient, he or she should apply the stereotypes of that

group to their self-concept, or self-stereotype. Since
African Americans are a stigmatized group that is
associated with negative stereotypes that are pervasive,
then their self-concepts should be negatively affected
such that they should associate such negative stereotypes

with their self-concept. We predicted that the effects on
implicit and explicit self-stereotyping will parallel

those of the self-esteem results: negative performance

feedback linked to their ethnic identity should result in
no change to explicit negative self-stereotyping, but lead
to relatively strong implicit negative self-stereotyping.

To address the above two main goals of the Study 2,

we made ethnic identity salient for all participants, then

administered the same "intelligence test" and feedback
procedure from the Study 1. We eliminated the no identity

salient condition from Study 1 because, per our

prediction, there was effect of feedback on
self-evaluations in that condition. Following this
procedure, participants completed the measures of

self-esteem and self-stereotyping, followed by the
measures of protective mechanisms and early experiences

with racism.
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Method

Participants and Design
Forty-three self-identified African-American students

(83.7% women; Mage = 24.60, age range: 18-40 years) from
California State University, San Bernardino, participated

in this study for course extra credit. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two performance feedback
conditions: negative or no feedback.

Independent Variable

Negative Performance Feedback. The same procedure
from Study 1 will be used in this study.

Dependent Variables
Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem. The measures of
implicit and explicit self-esteem are identical to those

used in Study 1.
Implicit Self-Stereotyping. An IAT was used to assess
the strength of associating the self with African American

stereotypes (Self-Stereotyping IAT; see Attachment G). The
overall IAT procedure is similar to the Self-Esteem IAT
used in the Study 1. However, of the 4 types of stimuli

presented (two types consisting of first-person and

third-person pronouns from the Self-Esteem IAT), two types
of stimuli consisted of words related to the African

American negative stereotype that they are unintelligent
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(e.g., "unintelligent", "naive") and stereotype-irrelevant

negative words related to the body (e.g., "sick",
"diseased") . The negative stereotype stimuli were

pretested for negativity and category label (e.g., "mind"
or "body").

Explicit Self-Stereotyping. The explicit measure was

a self-report questionnaire that used common negative

stereotypes associated with African Americans (Devine,

1989; see Attachment G). The questionnaire asked
participants to rate the extent to which they believed

that each of the attributes described a quality they
possessed. Participants responded on a 6-point scale
ranging from (1) not at all characteristic of me to (6)

extremely characteristic of me.

Self-Protective Mechanisms. First, the Disengagement

of Self-Esteem From Feedback on Intelligence Tests
subscale of the Intellectual Orientation Inventory (Major,

1995) was administered to assess the degree to which
participants disengage their self-esteem from performance

feedback (see Attachment H). The subscale asked
participants to rate the extent to which they agree or
disagree on a 7-point scale on the following three items:

(1) "No intelligence test will ever change my opinion of
how intelligent I am," (2) "How I do intellectually has
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little relation to who I really am," and (3) "I really

don't care what tests say about my intelligence." Higher

numbers indicate greater disengagement. We used an
additional item to assess the importance of intelligence
to the individual: "Doing well on intellectual tasks is

very important to me" (see Attachment H; Major & Schmader,
1998) .

Second, we used 2 items similar to the Major,
Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, and Crocker (1998) study to

assess whether students thought the intelligence test was
biased against their race:

(1) "I have an unfair advantage

on the intelligence test I took because of my racial
background" and (2) "I think the intelligence test I took
is biased against racial minorities." All ratings were

made on a 7-point scale ranging from (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Higher numbers indicate

greater disengagement.
Early Experiences of Perceived Racism. A modified

version of the Everyday Discrimination Scale (EDS; Forman,

Williams, & Jackson, 1997; Clark, Coleman, & Novak, 2004)
was used to assess participants' early experiences with

racism. The original version has 9 items that assess how
often particular events occurred to a respondent as a

function of their race. The EDS has acceptable predictive
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validity. Several studies using the EDS have found that it

predicts depressive symptoms (Siefert, Finlayson,
Williams, Delva, and Ismail, 2007; Kessler, Mickelson, &

Williams 1999), and negative affect, .social conflict, and
global•reports of perceived stress (Taylor, Kamarck, &

Shiftman, 2004). The items were modified so that they

refer to their experiences as a child (e.g., "When I was a
child, I was treated with less courtesy because of my
race" and "When I was a child, I was called names because

of my race" (see Attachment I). Responses on the 5-point

Likert scale ranged from 0 (never) to 5 (very frequently).
Procedure

An experimenter informed participants that they will

participate in two separate and unrelated studies, one on
cognition and another on personality. To enhance the "two

separate studies" cover story, participants reviewed and
signed two different consent forms. In the "first study"
participants completed the computerized intelligence test,
and in the "second study" participants completed the

implicit and explicit self-esteem and self-stereotyping
measures which were counterbalanced. Next, participants
completed the self-protective mechanism measures followed
*
by the early experiences with racism measure. Finally,
participants completed an extensive demographics
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questionnaire, which probed for suspicion of the purpose

of the study, and then participants were thoroughly
debriefed. Following the same procedure as Study 1, we

identified participants who strongly identified with being
African American (n = 36) and conducted separate analyses

including only those participants.
Results

Descriptives
Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem. Scores on the
measure of implicit self-esteem indicated that
participants had relatively high implicit self-esteem

(M ~ .68; SD = .35). The score on this measure was
normally distributed (zskew = -.54). Scores on the measure

of explicit self-esteem indicated that participants had

relatively high explicit self-esteem (M = 3.84; SD = .55,
ot = .87) and the distribution of scores was negatively
skewed (zskew = -2.70). Additionally, the measures of

implicit and explicit self-esteem were not significantly
correlated r = -.152, p = .33.

Implicit and Explicit Self-Stereotyping. Scores on
the measure of implicit self-stereotyping indicated that

participants did not strongly associate themselves with
negative intelligence words (M = .26; SD = .31) and the
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score on this measure was normally distributed

(zskew = 1.52). Scores on the measures of explicit
self-stereotyping indicated that participants viewed

themselves relatively positively (M = 1.43; SD == .44,
ot = .48) and did not associate themselves highly with
negative stereotypes (M = 2.15; SD = .83 ot = .48). The
score on the positive stereotype words was positively
skewed (zskew = 3.75) and the scores on the negative

stereotype words was normally distributed (zskew = 2.09).
Additionally, the measure of implicit self-stereotyping
was not correlated with positive stereotype words

r = .135, p = .390 or negative stereotype words r - -.156,
p = .317.
Early Experiences with Racism. Scores on the measure

of early experiences with racism indicated that
participants, on average, reported having a moderate
amount of early experiences with racism as a child

(M = 2.59; SD = 1.07, a = .92). Scores on this measure
were normally distributed (zskew = 1.42).

Disengagement from Intelligence. Scores on the
measure of disengagement from intelligence indicated that
participants had low levels of disengagement from

intelligence (M = 1.72; SD = 1, ot = .70) . Scores on this

measure were positively skewed (zskew = 5.01).
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Main Effects of Feedback on Implicit and Explicit
Self-esteem
Unfortunately, a test of the primary hypotheses
yielded no support for the predicted effect of feedback on

implicit self-esteem. Specifically, an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) revealed that although implicit
self-esteem was somewhat lower in the negative feedback

condition (M = .60) relative to the no feedback condition
(M = .74),
F

this effect was not statistically significant,

(1, 40) = 1.88, p = .18. However, an ANOVA revealed that

strongly identified African American participants
exhibited lower implicit self-esteem after receiving

negative performance feedback (M = .51) compared to the no

feedback condition (M = .78), F (1, 34) = 6.59, p = .015,
Cohen's d = .875 (see Figure 2). As predicted, explicit

self-esteem did not vary as a function of feedback
F (1,

40) = .924, p > .05.

Main Effect of Feedback on Implicit and Explicit
Self-stereotyping
Unfortunately, a test of the primary hypotheses
yielded no support for the predicted effect of feedback on

implicit self-stereotyping. Specifically, an analysis of

variance (ANOVA) revealed that implicit self-stereotyping
did not vary as a function of receiving negative feedback

(M = .21) on an intelligence test versus no feedback
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(M = .29), F (1, 40) = .870, p = .36. As predicted, we did
not expect a significant effect to emerge on explicit

self-esteem as a function of feedback, F (1, 40) = .753,

p > .05.

Main Effect of Feedback on Early Experiences with
Racism and Main Effect of Feedback on
Disengagement from Intelligence
Unfortunately, a test of feedback on early

experiences with racism yielded no support for the

predicted effect of negative feedback on intelligence
resulting in more reported early experiences with racism.

Specifically, an ANOVA revealed that reports of early

experiences with racism did not vary as a function of
feedback F (1, 41) = .525, p = .473. Likewise, a test of
feedback on disengagement from intelligence yielded no

support for the predicted effect of negative feedback
resulting in higher scores of disengagement from

intelligence. An ANOVA revealed that scores on the
disengagement from intelligence measure did not vary as a

function of feedback F (1, 41) = .184, p = .670.

Additional Analyses Involving Implicit Self-Esteem
for Strongly Identified African Americans
To test the relation between early experiences with
racism and feedback, we conducted a hierarchical
regression in which implicit self-esteem was used as the
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outcome variable. In the first step of the regression
equation, we included the predictor variables—early
experiences with racism (which was centered) and feedback,

followed by the addition of the two-way interaction
variable. Results revealed a significant interaction

effect between early experiences with racism and feedback,
explaining an additional 5.6% of the variance in implicit

self-esteem, Multiple R = .562, R2 ~ .316,
F

(3, 32) = 4.92, p < . 05 (see Figure 3). Simple slope

analyses ((Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that, among
participants who reported more early experiences with
racism, negative feedback led to lower levels of implicit

self-esteem compared to the no feedback condition,
B = -.532, t(32) = -1.66, p < .05 (see Table 1).
Furthermore, among participants who did not receive

negative feedback (i.e., control condition), the more
early experiences they had with racism, the higher levels

of implicit self-esteem, B = .509, p = .02. No other
relations were significant.

We used a similar regression model to test the

combined effect of feedback and disengagement from the
intelligence domain on implicit self-esteem. The main
effect of disengagement from intelligence was not
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significant, B = -.168, p = .381 and interaction effect
was not significant, B = .049, p = .799.

Additional Analyses Involving Explicit Self-Esteem
for Strongly Identified African Americans
To test the relationship between disengagement from

intelligence and feedback, on explicit self-esteem, we
conducted a hierarchical regression in which explicit

self-esteem was used as the outcome variable.' In the first
step of the regression equation, we included the predictor

variables—disengagement (which was centered) and feedback,

followed by the addition of the two-way interaction
variable. Results revealed a marginally significant
interaction effect of Disengagement X Feedback, explaining

an additional 2% of the variance in explicit self-esteem,
Multiple R = .442, R2 = .195, F (3, 32) = 2.59, p = .07

(see Figure 4). The pattern suggests that among

participants who strongly disengage from intelligence,
those who receive negative feedback report higher explicit

self-esteem compared to participants who receive no
feedback, b = .172, t(32) = .90, p = .381. These patterns
are in line with what Crocker et al. predict about African

Americans adopting protective mechanisms when faced with a

threat to the self. We also tested the relationship
between early experiences with racism and feedback on
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explicit self-esteem and there were no significant main
effects or interactions.

Simple slope analyses revealed that, among
participants who weakly or strongly disengaged from

intelligence, feedback did not affect explicit
self-esteem, Bs = -.08, .22, ps = 36, 44, respectively.
We used a similar regression model to test the

combined effect of feedback and early experiences with
racism on explicit self-esteem. The main effect of early

experiences with racism was not significant, B = -.443,
p = .09 and interaction effect was not significant,

B = .36, p = .799.
The Effect of Feedback on Implicit and Explicit
Self-Stereotyping for Strongly Identified African
Americans

The effect of feedback on implicit and explicit

self-stereotyping revealed no significant main effects or
interactions even with strong ethnic identification as a
moderator.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current research was to test the

APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) as a framework
for demonstrating the conditions under which the implicit
and explicit self-evaluations of African Americans are

affected. For African-Americans, threatening feedback
about an intellectual task when their ethnic identity is

salient should activate associative and propositional

processes. In support of these hypotheses, Study 1 showed
that among African-American participants whose ethnic

identity was salient, those who received negative feedback
exhibited lower implicit self-esteem, but no effect on

explicit self-esteem, compared to those receiving no
feedback. However, among participants whose ethnic
identity was not made salient, there were no significant

effects of implicit or explicit self-esteem as a result of

feedback. The purpose of Study 2 was to provide additional
evidence to support the proposed propositional versus

associative processes underlying implicit and explicit
self-evaluations. To this end, Study 2 assessed a second

measure of self-evaluations, self-stereotyping, and
examined the effects and relations among self-evaluations,
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early experiences with racism, and disengagement from

intelligence domains as a protective mechanism. We

predicted that negative feedback will result in lower
implicit self-esteem, higher implicit self-stereotyping,

more reported early experiences with racism, and more
disengagement from an intelligence test compared to

receiving no feedback. Further, we predicted that negative

feedback will not affect explicit self-esteem or explicit

self-stereotyping. Also, we predicted that frequent early
experiences with racism will be associated with low
implicit self-esteem and high implicit self-stereotyping

among participants who receive negative feedback (relative
to a no-feedback condition). Similarly, we predicted that

higher disengagement scores from intelligence will be
associated with high explicit self-esteem and low explicit

self-stereotyping among participants who receive negative
feedback (relative to a no-feedback condition).

Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, when their
ethnicity is made salient, strongly identified African
Americans exhibited lower implicit self-esteem, but not

lower explicit self-esteem, after receiving negative

performance feedback on an intelligence test. Contrary to
our predictions, feedback did not affect implicit or

explicit self-stereotyping, nor did it have a main effect
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on early experiences with racism and disengagement from
the intelligence domain. However, in partial support of

the APE model, frequent early experiences with racism

resulted in lower implicit self-esteem among participants
who received negative feedback compared to participants

who did not receive any feedback. Further, greater

disengagement from the intelligence domain was associated

with high explicit self-esteem (but not implicit
self-esteem) among participants who did not receive
negative feedback.

The current research sought to understand the
processes involved in evaluating the self of

African-Americans by integrating the self-protective

mechanism literature and the dual processing literature.
According to the APE (Gawronksi & Bodenhausen, 2006), a
dual processing model, automatic processes affect implicit

self-evaluations and propositional processes affect
explicit self-evaluations. Specifically, implicit

self-evaluations are affected by contextual cues that
trigger old evaluations that are stored in memory and

explicit self-evaluations are affected by the propositions

individuals introduce or add to assess the validity of an
automatic evaluation. We proposed that the self-protective

mechanisms (Crocker & Major, 1989) that African Americans
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adopt when they receive threatening intelligence-related

feedback linked to their ethnicity serve as propositional
processes when assessing the accuracy of an evaluation and
are shown on explicit measures of self-evaluations.

Furthermore, we proposed that early experiences with

racism are more accessible when African Americans' ethnic

identity is made salient and they receive threatening

feedback, and thus activate automatic processes which are
shown on measures of implicit self-evaluations.
Our results bridge the literatures on the
self-protective mechanisms of African Americans and the

literature on the APE model. A major aspect of the APE
model is that propositional processes are used to test the
validity of an associative evaluation. In the current

study, the associative evaluation was low implicit

self-esteem, and the propositional process was the use of
protective mechanisms (i.e., disengaging from
intelligence), which resulted in no differences on

explicit self-esteem between experimental and control

groups The APE model predicts that such an effect should
occur when there are contextual cues (i.e., negative
feedback) that trigger old evaluations in memory. Further,

they predict that when the evaluation is deemed invalid,
explicit self-evaluations may not be affected because
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propositions are considered - such as self-protective

mechanisms — to combat any "invalid" evaluations. Thus,
the current studies provide partial support for the

predictions associated with the research on
self-protective mechanisms and the APE model.

It appears that strong identification with being
African American moderates the relationship between

feedback and self-esteem. We found that participants who
strongly identify as African American show lower levels of
implicit self-esteem when they receive negative feedback

compared to a no-feedback condition. This suggests that
strong identifiers may be more aware of the stigma

associated with their group and certain cues (i.e.,
negative feedback) trigger old evaluations of the stigma
that are stored in memory, resulting in lower implicit

self-esteem.
The self-evaluations of members from stigmatized

groups may be influenced by stigma but only for
individuals who strongly identify with that group

(Rosenberg, 1979). Thus, self-esteem may be affected by
the recollection of early experiences with racism which

may be more accessible to individuals who strongly

identify with a stigmatized racial group. African

American's opinions (i.e., private regard) about their
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social group predicted personal self-esteem for African
Americans who highly identified with their racial group,
but not for those who were low identifiers (Rowley,

Sellers, Chavous, & Smith, 1998). Similarly, one study
showed that women who highly identified with their gender
showed lower performance than low identified women in a

stereotype threat context (Wout, Danso, Jackson, &
Spencer, 2008). Okeke, Howard, Kurtz-Costes, and Rowley

(2009) found that racial centrality moderated the

relationship between academic race stereotypes and

self-concept, such that participants who endorsed academic
race stereotypes had lower academic self-concepts when
they highly identified as African American. These findings

suggest that racial centrality can serve as a moderator
when examining performance and self-perception and it is
an important variable to consider when examining the
impact of a stigmatized identity on self-evaluations.
The current research has implications for the gap or

'education disparity between African American and White
students' academic performance because negative
self-evaluations or the internalization of stigma can lead

to negative performance behavior. Situational cues that
suggest that negative stereotypes are representative of an

individual in a threatening situation (i.e., test-taking
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environment) can result in low performance. In their
classic stereotype-threat study, Steele and Aronson (1995)

found that when African American participants were told
that a test would be diagnostic of their intellectual

ability, they underperformed compared to a group that was
not given such information. They conclude that this

process occurs because African Americans are aware of the
negative stereotypes that exist about their group and the

context creates a threat that the individual does not wish
•to confirm. The APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006)

argues that the context (e.g., taking an intelligence
test) is triggering old evaluations stored in memory and

thus influencing self-evaluations and their performance.
Perhaps African Americans underperform when reminded of
their ethnicity because their old self-evaluations (i.e.,
low self-esteem) are being triggered when faced with a

threat to the self. It should be noted that when African

Americans are not reminded of their ethnicity, they do not
show lower self-esteem (see Study 1). When a stigmatized

identity is induced through contextual cues (i.e., ethnic
identity salience) the outcome can be stress or anxiety
which can deplete cognitive resources to perform on a task
(Schamder & Johns, 2003). Thus, African Americans whose

stigmatized identity is salient may perform poorly in
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school because cognitive resources are inaccessible as a
result of stress and anxiety induced by threats in the

environment. Research on stereotype threat (Steele &

Aronson, 1995) suggests that the mechanism that leads to
stereotype threat is possibly anxiety which therefore
results in low test performance.
A short term effect of low implicit self-esteem in

individuals is that they may be defensive in relevant

situations (i.e., receiving negative performance feedback)
that threaten their self-concept. Jordan, Spencer, and

Zanna (2003) found that among participants who had high

explicit self-esteem, those who learned that they had low
implicit self-esteem (following negative performance
feedback) became defensive. More specifically, they
rationalized their decisions more and highly favored

in-group members in a minimal group context. Jordan et al.
(2003) suggests that high explicit self-esteem individuals

tend to be more aggressive and derogate other people.

Thus, it is the low implicit self-esteem in the

individuals who also have high explicit self-esteem that
possibly leads to the derogating behavior that likely

serves as a protective mechanism. For participants who
highly identified with being African American, they showed

lower implicit self-esteem when receiving negative
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feedback, but their explicit self-esteem was unaffected

and was relatively high. Thus, if given the opportunity to
engage in defensive behavior previous research predicts
that they would.
The long term effects of low implicit self-esteem may

be that these individuals are more likely to use
protective mechanisms because they cannot reconcile that

they have high explicit self-esteem, but implicitly have
low self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003). There are many ways

to use protective mechanisms, such as disengaging from a

domain that is not important to your social group or, as
Jordan et al.,

(2003) found, people can become defensive

by derogating others or trying hard to rationalize a
decision. Another long term effect of low implicit

self-esteem would be depression and perhaps a damaged

overall well-being (Ashburn-Nardo, 2010). Given the
pervasiveness of implicit self-esteem, more research is
needed to understand its long term implications.

The data of Study 1 and Study 2 demonstrate that
explicit self-evaluations are unaffected by ethnic

identity salience and negative performance feedback. These
data also demonstrate that African-Americans adopt

protective mechanisms to shield the self from threats in
their environment. If African Americans use protective
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mechanisms such as disengagement from an intelligence
domain, then such mechanisms can have the unfortunate

effect of compromised school performance (Steele, 1997).
Put differently, the negative consequence to disengaging

from intelligence domains is that students may not be
motivated to perform well in school (Major & Schmader,
1998; Steele, 1997).

Limitations
Given that the current samples consist of college
students, there may be some concerns about the design of
the study. Although the present and other studies

primarily use a college student samples (e.g., Crocker,
Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, & Schmader, 1998;

Major, Spencer, Schamder, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998), Twenge
and Crocker (2002) state that African American college
students' high explicit self-esteem (relative to Whites)

could be a reflection of them learning about history and
cultural achievements of African Americans. There is also

support that African American-centered education increases
self-esteem in African Americans (Baldwin, Brown, &
Rackley, 1990; Berger & Milem, 2000) . Based on this

research, it is questionable whether the effect of high
explicit self-esteem would generalize to a sample of
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African Americans who did not attend college. I would
argue that the explicit self-esteem of African American
non-college students or graduates would mirror that of

African American college students or graduates. African
American grassroot organizations and political movements

in the media (e.g., NAACP) suggest that the plight of

African Americans was due to institutional racism. This
message can be used as a protective mechanism. In

addition, the government has issued policies such as
affirmative action which acknowledges that some companies
may not hire stigmatized individuals unless it was

encouraged. This point supports the protective mechanism

argument that, "I wasn't hired because of my stigmatized
identity." Therefore, I argue that there are multiple

situations in the general public in which protective
mechanism may be adopted and thereby result in high
explicit self-esteem for African Americans who have not
attended college. However, most research studies use a

college sample and the notion that African American

non-college students or graduates have similar levels of

self-esteem as African American college students or
graduates should be tested.

Another limitation to Study 2 is the relatively low

sample size. The pattern of results are in line with most
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of our predictions, but they were, in some instances, not

significant. We suspect that this is due to the small
sample size. Adding participants will allow us to conduct
a stronger test of the effects of feedback, early
experiences with racism, and disengagement from
intelligence on the implicit and explicit self-esteem of

African Americans. The present data allowed us to test the

effects of feedback among strongly identified African
Americans only. To conduct a true of the moderating effect

of ethnic identification, participants who weakly versus

strongly identified will need to be recruited.
We found no effect of feedback on implicit or

explicit self-stereotyping. The measure we used consisted
of unintelligent words (i.e., naive, gullible) and
negative body related words (i.e., diseased, sick). It is
plausible that this measure did not tap into the construct

of self-stereotyping. We predicted that participants who

received negative feedback would associate highly with the
unintelligent words opposed to the irrelevant, negative

body related words. Our prediction was not supported,
there was no difference between the negative feedback
condition and the no feedback condition. Perhaps the
terms, "naive" and "gullible" do not represent

unintelligence in the sense of academic unintelligence.
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African Americans are stereotyped to be unintelligent, but

this sense of unintelligence is primarily in the academic
sense and not in other domains such as social
intelligence. In other words, "naive" and "gullible" are
stereotypes that are not particular to African Americans,
therefore, when African Americans see these words, they

may not associate with these words because they are

irrelevant to academic intelligence and are more relevant
to interpersonal relationships.

Future Direction
As mentioned earlier, our participants are college

students. To fully understand the self-evaluations of
African Americans, it will be important to examine a

population of African Americans who are not college
students. African Americans do not make up a large sample
of college students, therefore, there is likely a
difference in the thoughts and behaviors of college and
non-college African Americans. Thus, future studies should

focus on examining the self-evaluations of a community
sample of African Americans to see if their
self-evaluations are different than those of a college

sample of African Americans. As stated previously, I
suspect that there will be no major differences between
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African American college students and graduates and
African American non-college students or graduates when
considering self-esteem following a threat to the self.

However, this is an empirical question that can be
scientifically addressed.
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Ethnic Identity

Figure 1. Effects of Ethnic Identity Salience and Feedback
on Implicit Self-esteem. Higher Numbers on the Y-axis

Signify Higher Implicit Self-esteem
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11

u
5
C/3 0.8 -

Feedback
Figure 2. Effects of Feedback on Implicit Self-esteem of

Strongly Identified African Americans. Higher Numbers on
the Y-axis Signify Higher Implicit Self-esteem
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Control
Experimental

Figure 3. Relationship between Feedback and Early
Experiences with Racism on Implicit Self-esteem. Higher

Numbers on the Y-axis Signify Higher Implicit Self-esteem
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No Feedback
Feedback

Figure 4. Relationship between Feedback and Disengagement
from Intelligence on Explicit Self-esteem. Higher Numbers

on the Y-axis Signify Higher Explicict Self-esteem
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Table 1. Mean Effects of Feedback on Implicit and Explicit

Self-esteem as a Function of Levels of Disengagement from
Intelligence and Early Experiences with Racism.
Implicit Self-Esteem

Explicit Self-Esteem

Feedback No Feedback Feedback No Feedback
Disengagers
Strong

0.56

0.61

4.14

3.77

Weak

0.46

0.88

3.69

3.73

Frequent

*
0.57

0.94

3.43

3.73

Few

0.43

0.74

3.78

4.01

Early Experiences

Note. ** denotes significance at p < .05 and * denotes marginal
significance p < .10.
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APPENDIX A
INTELLIGENCE TEST
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Intelligence Test
Which is the odd one out?
Mars, Jupiter, Comet, Earth, Neptune
a
Mars
b
Jupiter
c
Comet
d
Earth
e
Neptune
Library is to book as book is to:
a
Page
b
Copy
c
Binding
d
Cover

Which pattern completes the series?

OC CD EE ::TOOT±
A

a
b
c
d

B

C

D

A
B
C
D

Which two words are closest in meaning?
Composite, Synthetic, Shabby, Different, Pseudo, Symbolic
a
Composite and Different
b
Synthetic and Symbolic
c
Shabby and Pseudo
d
Synthetic and Pseudo
e
Different and Symbolic
Ice is to water as liquid is to:
a
Gas
b
Steam
c
Temperature
d
Solid
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6
A regular octagon can be divided into 8 identical triangles by drawing how many
straight lines?
a
4
b
5
c
6
d
8
2

Choose the answer that best completes the series.
Euro, Dollar, Franc, Peso,
a
Yen
b
Currency
c
Cash
d
Check

8
165135
a
b
c
d

is to peace as 1215225 is to:
Leaf
Love
Loop
Castle

9

A university library budget committee must reduce exactly five of eight areas of
expenditure -- G, L, M, N, P, R, S, and W - in accordance with the following
conditions:
If both G and S are reduced, W is also reduced.
If N is reduced, neither R nor S is reduced.
If P is reduced, L is not reduced.
Of the three areas L, M, and R, exactly two are reduced.

Which of the following could be a complete and accurate list of the areas of
expenditure reduced by the committee?
G, L, M, N, W
G, L, M, P, W
G, M,N,R, W
G, M, P, R, S
L, M, R, S, W
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10
A university library budget committee must reduce exactly five of eight areas of
expenditure — G, L, M, N, P, R, S, and W — in accordance with the following
conditions:
If both G and S are reduced, W is also reduced.
If N is reduced, neither R nor S is reduced.
If P is reduced, L is not reduced.
Of the three areas L, M, and R, exactly two are reduced.
If W is reduced, which of the following could be a complete and accurate list of the
four other areas of expenditure to be reduced?
G, M, P, S
L, M, N, R
L, M, P, S
M, N, P, S
M, P, R, S

11

A university library budget committee must reduce exactly five of eight areas of
expenditure -- G, L, M, N, P, R, S, and W — in accordance with the following
conditions:
If both G and S are reduced, W is also reduced.
If N is reduced, neither R nor S is reduced.
If P is reduced, L is not reduced.
Of the three areas L, M, and R, exactly two are reduced.
If P is reduced, which one of the following is a pair of areas of expenditure both of
which must be reduced?
G,M
M, R
N, R
R,S

s, w
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12

A university library budget committee must reduce exactly five of eight areas of
expenditure — G, L, M, N, P, R, S, and W -- in accordance with the following
conditions:
If both G and S are reduced, W is also reduced.
If N is reduced, neither R nor S is reduced.
If P is reduced, L is not reduced.
Of the three areas L, M, and R, exactly two are reduced.
If both L and S are reduced, which one of the following could be a pair of areas of
expenditure both of which are reduced?
G,M
G,P
N,R
N, W
P,S

13
A university library budget committee must reduce exactly five of eight areas of
expenditure — G, L, M, N, P, R, S, and W — in accordance with the following
conditions:
If both G and S are reduced, W is also reduced.
If N is reduced, neither R nor S is reduced.
If P is reduced, L is not reduced.
Of the three areas L, M, and R, exactly two are reduced.

Which one of the following areas must be reduced?
G
L
N
P
W
14

Which of the patterns completes the series?

nz

i

_□ L_J ZJLN
A

a
b
c
d

C

B

A
B
C
D
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D

15
Aztecs is to Mexico as Incas is to:
a
Europe
b
Peru
c
Atlantis
d
Babylon
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APPENDIX B
SELF-ESTEEM IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST STIMULI
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Self-Esteem Implicit Association Test Stimuli

Me: I, me, my, mine, myself
Not me: they, them, their, theirs, others
Pleasant: smile, gift,joy, paradise, laughter

Unpleasant: filth, cancer, vomit, war, poison
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APPENDIX C
STATE SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
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State Self-esteem Scale
(Heatherton, T. F., & Polivy, J. (1991). Development and validation of a scale for
measuring state self-esteem. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 60,
895-910.)
Using the following scale, place a number on the line to the right of the statement that
indicates what is true for you at this moment:

1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = very much, 5 - extremely
1.

I feel confident about my abilities.

_______

2.

Iam worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.

_______

3.

I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.

_______

4.

I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.

_______

5.

I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.

_______

6.

I feel that others respect and admire me.

_______

7.

Iam dissatisfied with my weight.

_______

8.

I feel self-conscious.

_______

9.

I feel as smart as others.

_______

10. I feel displeased with myself.

_______

11. I feel good about myself.

_______

12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.

_______

13. Iam worried about what other people think of me.

_______

14. I feel confident that I understand things.

_______

15. I feel inferior to others at this moment.

_______

16. I feel unattractive.

_______

17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.

_______

18. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.

_______

19. I feel like I’m not doing well.

_______

20. I am worried about looking foolish.

_______
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APPENDIX D
DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE
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Demographics Questionnaire
1.

What is your gender?

2.

What is your age?

3.

What is your resident status?
U.S. Citizen
Permanent Resident
Foreign Student
Other (Specify)

4.

Please indicate which area your undergraduate major belongs from the list
below
Arts and Letters
Business
Education
Natural Sciences
Social and Behavioral Sciences
Interdisciplinary
Undeclared or uncertain

5.

What is your FIRST language (i.e., the language you speak the most fluently)?

6.

If English is not your first language, how long have you been speaking
English?
Less than 1 year
I-4 years
5-10 years
II- 15 years
More than 15 years
Does not apply

7.

Please check the box that best describes you:
American Indian/Alaskan Native
Asian or Pacific Islander
Black, not of Hispanic origin
Hispanic
White, not of Hispanic origin
Multi-racial (Specify)
Another ethnicity not listed
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8.

My vision is:
Normal without glasses/contacts
Normal with glasses or contacts that I am wearing now
Require glasses/contacts, but I DON’T have them with me

9.

How comfortable do you feel using computers?
Uncomfortable
Somewhat uncomfortable
Somewhat comfortable
Comfortable

10. What type of computer do you use most often?
PC compatible/PC type
Apple/Macintosh
11. Please indicate which psychology courses you have taken from the list below.
Please check all boxes that apply and then click “Continue”.
Psychology 310 (advanced research methods)
Psychology 311 (experimental)
Psychology 382 (social)
Psychology 385 (personality)
Psychology 421-432 (advanced seminar)
Psychology 431-438 (advanced lab)
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APPENDIX E

SUSPICION OF PURPOSE OF THE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
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Suspicion of Purpose of the Study Questionnaire
Questionnaire about the studies
1.

In the first study, you completed an intelligence test. Did you receive
feedback (i.e., a score) about your responses?

____ YES

____ NO

2. Can you describe your thoughts and feelings about the intelligence test (and,
if you received a score, your feelings about it as well)?

3. IF YOU RECEIVED A SCORE, please indicate how you felt about the
score:

Negative 1.......2....... 3....... 4....... 5....... 6........ 7 Positive
4. What do you think the purpose of the two studies was about?

3. Do you think there was any connection between the first study and the
second study?

___ YES

___ NO

IF YES: Can you elaborate on what you think the connection was?

PLEASE TURN TO THE OTHER SIDE.
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4. Do you think your responses on the intelligence test or the feedback you
received in the first study affected your responses in the second study?

___ YES

___ NO

IF YES: Can you elaborate on how you think your responses were influenced?

Thank you! Please open the door and have a seat.
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APPENDIX F

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF FEEDBACK
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Debriefing Statement and Acknowledgment of Feedback
Explanation of the Study

Please Read Carefully
Explanation of the Study
The study you completed is examining the relation between feedback on a bogus test and
African-Americans’ self-evaluations. All participants completed the same intelligence test.
Regardless of performance, half of the participants received negative feedback about their
performance; the other half received no feedback. In general, we expect that individuals who
receive negative feedback will experience lower levels of self-esteem and use negative
stereotypes about African-Americans to evaluate themselves.

It is very important that you know and understand that forparticipants who receivedfeedback,
that the feedback was bogus - in other words, it was not based on actual responses and, in
reality, the feedback was predetermined by the computer. Specifically, half of the participants

did not receive any feedback after completing the intelligence test, and the other half received
a score of 47lh percentile. Again, this score had been determined prior to their arrival and it
was not influenced by their performance. In other words, participants who received feedback,
that percentile score contained absolutely no information about their actual responses on the
test. This deception was necessary because the study examines if the feedback that people
receive about their own intelligence influences their self-evaluations.
We thank you for participating. Your responses are important to our research because we hope
to understand the psychological processes that lead to negative self-evaluations.

Acknowledgement of Feedback
I completely understand that the test was not a real measure of intelligence, and that some
participants received bogus feedback about their performance and others received no feedback
about their performance. For participants who received feedback, the feedback was bogus and
does not reflect intelligence at all. I had the opportunity to ask questions and understand that
the investigators will answer any future questions I may have about this research and/or about
participants’ rights. I will be given the experimenter’s information for my records in order to
ask any questions I may have in the future.

Print Name

Signature

Date

The Cognitive and Personality Studies
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APPENDIX G

SELF-STEREOTYPING STIMULI
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Self-stereotyping Stimuli
IAT:

Mind-related negative stereotypes: Naive, Gullible, Unintelligent

Body-related negative stereotypes: Frail, Sick, Diseased
Self-Report:
Ambitious, smart, lazy, calm, stupid, loud, rich, ghetto, peaceful, welfare, aggressive,
poor, hardworking, wealthy
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APPENDIX H

SELF-PROTECTIVE MECHANISM MEASURE
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Self-protective Mechanism Measure
Instructions: Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree):

1.

No intelligence test will ever change my opinion of how intelligent I am

2.

How I do intellectually has little relation to who I really am

3.

I really don’t care what tests say about my intelligence

Instructions: Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements (1 - strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree):

1.

Being good at academics is an important part of who I am

2.

Doing well on intellectual tasks is very important to me

3.

Academic success is not very valuable to me

4.

It usually doesn’t matter to me one way or the other how I do in school
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APPENDIX I

EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH RACISM
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Early Experience with Racism

Instructions: Please reflect back to when you were a child and think about your general
childhood experiences. Rate the frequency for which the following has happened to
you as a child (0 = never and 5 = very frequently):
1.

When I was a child, I was treated with less courtesy because of my race.

2.

When I was a child, I was treated with less respect because of my race.

3.

When I was a child, I received poorer service because of my race.

4.

When I was a child, people would act as if I was not smart because of my race.

5.

When, I was a child, people would act as if they were afraid of me because of
my race.

6.

When I was a child, people would act as if I was dishonest because of my race.

7.

When I was a child, people would act as if they were better because of my race.

8.

When I was a child, I was called names because of my race.

9.

When I was a child, I was threatened or harassed because of my race.
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